| • |
... a virtually unlimited number of users
because the information for each user which
is needed for physical access control lies
in the "fS=4" structure
(see section 2.2 of the TPB027 document) |
| • |
... unattended data update in any CPU prior
to the physical access, thus enables changing
the user profile identifier inside the "fS=4"
structure:
‘User_Group’
(affect the "when" of access)
‘User_Type’
(affect the “how" of access)
‘Pass_Levels’
(affect the "where" of access)
and facilitates the logic administration of
such ID tags: unlock of anti Pass-Back
control,
reset of exhausted PIN, etc.
(see section 2.8 of the TPB027 document) |
| • |
... an interactive anti Pass-Back
control directly between the ID tag and the
CPU without need for an external program (PC)
to drive it, besides a control’s extinction
by "temporary period exceeded" (see
chapter 4 of the TPB027 document) |
| • |
... biometric authentication
through "hand profile", “fingerprint”
(according to standard ISO/IEC 19794-2), “palm
vein” and/or “weight” (to
control the user in a floodgate), all of them
based on the corresponding Template contained
in the “fS=4” structure (see section
4.1 and 5.1 of the TPB036 document) |
| • |
... a truly secret PIN
defined and known only by the user and replaceable
in its sole will and as often as it sees fit
(see section 2.2.4 of the TPB036 document) |
| • |
... different schemes of access permissions
to isolate up to 16 different Operational
Centers (buildings, factories, etc..) within
the same Site |
| • |
... full guarantee of “non cloning”
by using a Qontinuum’s algorithm that
neutralizes the key breakage by "brute
force". |
